

## The Morality of Care – Its Origin, Reception and Further Development from the Point of View of the Psychology of Morality

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Few books and authors affect a very broad spectrum of academic fields. When Carol Gilligan published the book *In a Different Voice* in 1982, she set off a wave of turbulent reactions, not all of which were positive. The subsequent discussions in the field of (not only) the psychology of morality lasted for decades. After more than thirty years Gilligan's book belongs amongst the basic literature in the humanities and we can learn both from its virtues and from its errors and drawbacks. The morality of care,<sup>1</sup> as Gilligan labelled her conception, has secured a place among other theories. It still has followers today: at present, it is a respected and generally acknowledged theory.

Although Gilligan as the pioneer and founder of the morality of care had to face many objections, it is not possible to deny that she has been – and still is – inspiring for psychology, sociology, philosophy, gender studies, and eventually also for politics. This paper aims to recall the circumstances in which Gilligan created her theory, what objections were raised against it, what direction she took, how she inspired further research, and what form further development has taken. Thereby I would like to extend the general awareness of the morality of care by the context of its origin and contribute to a deeper understanding of this theory. A secondary aim is to mediate a sample of a confrontation of different views of the same thing (in this case Gilligan's work). Next to sharp criticism and rejection, there is also enthusiasm, excitement from discovering a creative and open attitude to different views and the birth of a new philosophical current.

### 1. The starting points and primary inspiration of Gilligan's theory

Gilligan's theory of moral development<sup>2</sup> was at first partially formulated as an antithesis, or rather as a supplement to the existing theories, in particular those of Piaget<sup>3</sup> and Kohlberg.<sup>4</sup> Gilligan originally worked with Kohlberg. She worked with women and presented Kohlberg's dilemmas to them. In doing that she noticed that a certain sphere of morality had not been captured

1 I use the term 'morality of care' here because this is an analysis from the point of view of psychology of moral development and psychology of morality in general. 'Ethics of care' is rather used in connection with the philosophical point of view.

2 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 5–23.

3 Cf. Jean PIAGET, *The Child's Conception of the World*, Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1929, pp. 1–397; further cf. Jean PIAGET, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1948, pp. 1–417.

4 Cf. Lawrence KOHLBERG, The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years ten to sixteen. Dissertation, in *Moral Development: A compendium. Volume 3: Kohlberg's original study of moral development*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, pp. 1–499.

by Kohlberg at all. The deficiencies Gilligan found in the work of her predecessors prompted her to formulate her own theory of moral development. Gilligan called this 'other' morality a 'morality of care' and originally believed it to be proper 'only' to women,<sup>5</sup> and later 'rather' to women.<sup>6</sup> For better orientation in theories, it is good to clarify what terminology (not only) Gilligan employs. She designates Piaget's and Kohlberg' theory of morality as male, dominant, or even patriarchal. According to her, it is a morality of justice, which operates in the logic of equality and mutuality. She also uses the term 'moral orientation', in this case, an orientation on justice. According to Gilligan, the moral orientation on justice is more context-independent and the reasoning within it is more abstract and hypothetical. By 'the other' or 'another' or 'the new' morality, Gilligan means female morality, which she calls 'morality of care'. Its logic is the logic of interpersonal relationships. Sometimes she also uses the expression 'orientation on care'. According to Gilligan, the moral orientation on care is more context-dependent, deriving from the real situation.

## 2. Morality of care according to Gilligan

Gilligan places the definition of morality of care in opposition to the morality of justice. To illustrate this, I introduce the following example. Two children want to play, but at different activities – one at neighbours, the other one at pirates. It is possible to switch between the games, which is a solution at the level of justice and equality (*fair solution*), whereby each individual's way of playing remains intact. Another solution is to transform the two activities and create a new one, perhaps playing at pirates living in a neighbourhood (*inclusive solution*). In this solution not only does each child enter the imaginary world of the other, but at the same time changes that world by its presence: '*Whereas the fair solution protects identity and ensures equality within the context of relationship, the inclusive solution transforms identity through the experience of a relationship.*'<sup>7</sup>

According to Gilligan,<sup>8</sup> the female way of considering a problem sees the dilemma as a story of human relationships. The criterion is maintaining them and the solution of the story is guided to that end. In this logic, it is not essential whether someone does or does not have a right to something; fundamental are the relationships and the consequences of actions for the relationships. Understanding morality stems from acknowledging the relationship, from having faith in communication, which is the way of solving conflicts. Gilligan<sup>9</sup> calls for a paradigm shift. What is at stake, according to her, is not only the issue of morality, but a change in understanding the conception of the whole world. Our attention ought to be re-directed and focused on the desire for relationships, the pleasure of connection and the ability to create durable relationships, which are typical for humans.

## 3. The birth of a new methodology and of a new conception of the self

Together with a paradigm, Gilligan<sup>10</sup> also brought a new methodology of researching morality. Following her experience with the reaction of women to Kohlberg's pre-prepared dilemmas, she began to take interest in what the respondents themselves experience as morally dilemmatic. Such a real-life dilemma was the considering of abortion by pregnant women who had contacted a me-

5 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 105.

6 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, Mapping the moral domain: New images of self in relationship, *Cross Currents* 1/1989, p. 54; further cf. Carol GILLIGAN and Jane ATTANUCCI, Two moral orientations: Gender differences and similarities, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, p. 232.

7 Carol GILLIGAN, Mapping the moral domain: New images of self in relationship, p. 56.

8 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 28.

9 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, Hearing the difference: Theorizing connection, *Hypatia* 2/1995, pp. 121–122.

10 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 24–64.

dical clinic. Based on the data from interviews with them (twenty-nine pregnant women in all), Gilligan formulated her conception of the morality of care. Procedures of investigating real-life dilemmas were later elaborated by Gilligan's followers.<sup>11</sup>

Besides different judgment-formation, the researchers<sup>12</sup> also observed a different conception of the self. Respondents can perceive themselves as separated from others (*separate/objective self*) or as connected with others (*connected self*). This dichotomous thinking is taken up by Lyons<sup>13</sup> when she distinguishes between two ways of perceiving interpersonal relationships and relating to others: *reciprocity* and *response*. Reciprocity is an issue of the morality of justice and the response is an issue of the morality of care. The difference between response and reciprocity consists in focusing on the needs of the other.

The existence of two concepts of the self (separated from others and connected with others) has been confirmed, for example, by the investigation of Pratt and his colleagues.<sup>14</sup> It turned out that persons who perceive themselves as separated from others perceive themselves more individually, have a less sophisticated self-conception and less complex notions of personal relationships. In the case of perceiving the self as connected with others, the reverse was true.

#### 4. The path to an ethics of care

Ethics of care as a philosophical current has only been developing for several decades. It must be observed that it is not merely a matter of the feminist movement. Its development was sparked off by Carol Gilligan's book *In a Different Voice*. According to Held,<sup>15</sup> the significance of this work for moral theory does not consist only in defining how men and women consider moral questions, but in sketching out the alternative perspectives from which moral issues can be interpreted. The perspective of justice places an emphasis on universal moral principles, asks how these principles are to be applied to particular cases, and prefers the rational approach. The perspective of care focuses more on the needs of people, searches for ways of maintaining or improving real human relationships and, in forming moral judgments, gives prominence to having sensitivity to the situation.

The ethics of care can be understood and appreciated only when one becomes familiar with its specific language. Concepts such as 'care', 'attention', 'empathy', 'response', 'reciprocity' and 'receptivity' have special meanings in them. Caring is understood as the moral way of life. Many concepts and terms are used both in ethics of care and in ethics of justice, but they carry a different meaning in ethics of care (for example, 'reciprocity' or 'dependency'). For example, reciprocity is understood to mean that in a certain situation I am the one who cares and in another I will be the one who receives care.<sup>16</sup>

One of the basic building blocks of this, not only philosophical, current is the connection with others. Connection with others has to do with dependency, which can be perceived in two ways. First, it can be the opposite of independence, and, second, it can be understood as being opposite to isolation. The ideology of individual independence can easily obscure the positive experience of connection, which can be experienced through dependency. It is typical of humans that they

11 Cf. Nona Plessner LYONS, Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality, *Harvard Educational Review* 2/1983, pp. 143–145; further cf. Eva E. SKOE and James E. MARCIA, A measure of care-based morality and its relation to ego identity, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 2/1991, pp. 291–296.

12 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, Mapping the moral domain: New images of self in relationship, *Cross Currents* 1/1989, pp. 53–54; further cf. Nona Plessner LYONS, Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality, *Harvard Educational Review* 2/1983, pp. 140–141.

13 Cf. Nona Plessner LYONS, Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality, pp. 135–137.

14 Cf. Michael PRATT, Mark PANCER, Bruce HUNSBERGER and Judy MANCHESTER, Reasoning about the self and relationships in maturity: An integrative complexity analysis of individual differences, *Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology* 3/1990, pp. 579–580.

15 Cf. Virginia HELD, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 15–16.

16 Cf. Nel NODDINGS, The language of care ethics, *Knowledge Quest* 5/2012, pp. 53–54.

experience dependency upon others for a long period of their lives (childhood and adolescence). We should accept our dependency and connection with others and understand it in the sense of non-isolation. That we are dependent on others means that we are connected with them and that we are protected from isolation.<sup>17</sup> Being dependent in this sense does not mean to be powerless, to lack control; it means the possibility of having some effect – an impact on others. Dependency need not be perceived as a ‘ball and chain’. Dependency in a positive sense of the word can express that we can rely on others to give us understanding, love and comfort.<sup>18</sup>

But if dependency is understood in the traditional, and to a certain extent negative sense, when the bond with others prevents personal self-development, individuation and detachment from significant others (*detachment*), then we are thinking in traditional terms when a bond to others deprives us of autonomy. An example of that may be the period of adolescence, when the adolescent must emancipate him/herself from the bonds (especially to parents) and acquire his/her own autonomy. But if dependency on others is understood differently, i.e., in the new way as being opposite to isolation, then we can also reach a new view of autonomy. Autonomy can be attained, but at the same time it can be realised within connections and cohesion to others. Autonomy can be attained without disruption to relationships. According to Gilligan,<sup>19</sup> the right path, not only for an adolescent, is dialogue. Without communication, without a willingness to speak and risk disagreement, it is not possible to live with others in a satisfactory way. It is essential to stay responsible to oneself and to others, and to find such a path when the individual will not selfishly exclude others and at the same time will not selflessly exclude him/herself.

Although we understand concepts such as care, communication or cohesion well at the theoretical level, in our lives it is often difficult for us to find a balance between asserting oneself and reaching out to others, between caring and granting space for one’s own independence, between sharing and maintaining privacy (i.e., protection against potential injury). It is possible to say that it is an art of interpersonal relationships, which we can practice if we are willing to reflect on our experience in the right way.

## 5. Criticism and discussion of Gilligan’s work

Gilligan’s work *In a Different Voice* sparked off an extensive discussion, not only in the sphere of the psychology of morality. Not all reactions to her work can be regarded as pure criticism: some constitute an extension of her theory, an adjustment or a reinterpretation. Gilligan herself reacted to some criticisms and removed some shortcomings in her further research, conducted by herself or her co-workers (for example, an elaboration of the coding scheme,<sup>20</sup> including men in the research<sup>21</sup>). The criticism and discussion led the research in several further currents:

- verifying the existence of two moralities – of justice and care, or of two moral orientations;
- verifying whether the morality of care is really context-dependent, as Gilligan claims, while the morality of justice is more capable of abstracting from the context;
- verifying the male-female division of morality, i.e., male morality is a morality of justice, while the typical female morality is a morality of care.

17 Cf. Eva Feder KITTAY, The ethics of care, dependence and disability, *Ratio Juris* 1/2011, pp. 49–58.

18 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, Mapping the moral domain: New images of self in relationship, *Cross Currents* 1/1989, p. 60.

19 Ibid, p. 62.

20 Cf. Nona Plessner LYONS, Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality, *Harvard Educational Review* 2/1983, pp. 143–145.

21 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN and Jane ATTANUCCI, Two moral orientations: Gender differences and similarities, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, p. 228.



## 5.1 Methodological objections to Gilligan's work

Some authors (for example, Luria,<sup>22</sup> Nails,<sup>23</sup> Vasudev<sup>24</sup>) were so offended by Gilligan's work<sup>25</sup> that they compiled a criticism of her research focusing primarily on methodology. Other critics prefer to juxtapose their findings with Gilligan's. The criticism of the research, which I take to be a criticism of methodology, is aimed at the following:

- how and whom Gilligan interviewed (i.e., the non-representative character of the sample, abortion as a specific moral problem);
- how she categorised the data and how she presents it (there is no coding scheme, interpretation, citation, theoretical speculation and discussion are not clearly separated);
- how she draws conclusions from the data, and how she generalises it (bias, prejudice or even ideology).

Turiel<sup>26</sup> mentions as a methodological problem of Gilligan's research the fact that most data used to formulate judgment levels in morality of care (*care reasoning*) was obtained from interviews about abortion. He thinks that abortion is a very specific matter and judgments about it cannot be generalised to other moral matters. According to Smetana,<sup>27</sup> not even the judgments about abortion itself have been mapped rigorously enough. Smetana extended the investigated sample with women who had never been pregnant and found that the judgments of women in this issue are influenced by their view of the beginning of life (conception or birth of the child). In other words, Gilligan generalised the ungeneralisable and omitted important intervening variables.

Nails<sup>28</sup> gave Gilligan's original research the label *social-scientific sexism*. She regards Gilligan's defence of women and their specific morality as an ideology which wants to serve the oppressed (in this case women), but is a lame support of research. Similarly, Colby and Damon regard dividing morality into male and female as an ideology, rather than an empirically founded scientific claim. They think that science ought not to advance stereotypical perceptions of men and women.<sup>29</sup>

Besides bias and prejudice, Nails's particular objections<sup>30</sup> are aimed at the methodology of the research, at the presentation of the data and the way of conducting the interviews. The presentation of the data (i.e., interview samples) ought to be clearly distinguished from the researcher's interpretation of the data, so that the reader would not be confused. She thinks that Gilligan wants to make a certain impression on the reader and corroborate her pre-conceived theory. Luria also objects to Gilligan's style of writing. She thinks that Gilligan does not clearly separate theoretical speculations and data discussion. She regards the way Gilligan presents data as an '*impressionistic grouping of the stories Gilligan's subjects told*'.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, according to Colby and

22 Cf. Zella LURIA, A methodological critique, *Sign* 2/1986, pp. 316–321.

23 Cf. Debra NAILS, Social-scientific sexism: Gilligan's mismeasure of man, *Social Research* 3/1983, pp. 643–664.

24 Cf. Jyotsna VASUDEV, Sex differences in morality and moral orientation: A discussion of the Gilligan and Attanucci study, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, pp. 239–244.

25 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 1–184.

26 Cf. Elliot TURIEL, The development of morality, in *Handbook of Child Psychology*, ed. Richard. M. LERNER, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006, p. 808.

27 Cf. Judith G. SMETANA, Reasoning in the personal and moral domains: Adolescent and young adult women's decision-making regarding abortion. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology* 3/1981, p. 62.

28 Cf. Debra NAILS, Social-scientific sexism: Gilligan's mismeasure of man, *Social Research* 3/1983, p. 664.

29 Cf. Anne COLBY and William DAMON, Listening to a different voice: A review of Gilligan's *In a different voice*, in *Moral Development. A Compendium. Volume 6: Caring Voices and Women's Moral Frames: Gilligan's View*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, p. 282.

30 Cf. Debra NAILS, Social-scientific sexism: Gilligan's mismeasure of man, *Social Research* 3/1983, pp. 645–646.

31 Zella LURIA, A methodological critique, *Sign* 2/1986, p. 318.

Damon, Gilligan's book is full of 'exciting ideas' and written with 'force and elegance'.<sup>32</sup> Luria<sup>33</sup> focuses most on the insufficient description of the sample (i.e., age, social class, education and the way of selecting the respondent). According to Vasudev,<sup>34</sup> the lack of such specifications of the sample makes it difficult to interpret the direction of the research results. The respondents in the research were either women considering abortion, or Harvard students, which is, according to her, a highly unrepresentative sample. At the same time it is not quite clear who was interviewed and by what method. We only know that Gilligan realised several studies including women and in some cases also men, whereby the women were selected according to a specific criterion and were presented with questions selected by the author and, besides that, also with Kohlberg's dilemmas (that is why it is not quite clear to me whether Gilligan's sample was comprised of twenty-four or twenty-nine women considering abortion – author's note). Luria<sup>35</sup> regards such a description of the research methodology as totally inadequate. Data ought to be generalised and interpreted much more carefully than Gilligan did. A sample of twenty-nine women considering abortion can well give a report on the decision-making process, but data obtained in this way does not make it possible to conclude that women and men think in different ways. Similarly, according to Vasudev,<sup>36</sup> the sample is too small to allow the drawing of conclusions concerning moral orientation and gender differences. Colby and Damon regard the differences Gilligan found between men and women as intuitive.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, there almost totally lacks a clear stipulation of the rules for categorising the respondents' answers, especially when the data takes the form of clarifying, discussing abstract questions, etc. Kohlberg offered three scoring schemes, while Gilligan hardly one.<sup>38</sup> Vasudev briefly captures what other scientists find offensive about Gilligan's work: '*...the hiatus between tenuous data and strong claims.....It seems that the most valuable contribution of their investigation consists of suggestions for other researches and questions which need to be addressed in empirical research.*'<sup>39</sup>

## 5.2 Male and female morality?

A second point of criticism, mentioned partially already within the discussion of methodological shortcomings, is the author's conception of male and female morality. When Gilligan<sup>40</sup> published her ideas of the typically male morality of justice and the typically female morality of care, it was quite in place to empirically verify and statistically corroborate those claims. She 'specified' the originally fairly strict division of male and female morality when she, together with her co-workers, presented empirical evidence that the morality of justice is predominantly male, while the morality of care is predominantly female.<sup>41</sup>

32 Anne COLBY and William DAMON, Listening to a different voice: A review of Gilligan's *In a different voice*, in *Moral Development: A Compendium. Volume 6: Caring Voices and Women's Moral Frames: Gilligan's View*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, p. 275.

33 Cf. Zella LURIA, A methodological critique, *Sign* 2/1986, p. 319.

34 Cf. Jyotsna VASUDEV, Sex differences in morality and moral orientation: A discussion of the Gilligan and Attanucci study, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, p. 242.

35 Cf. Zella LURIA, A methodological critique, *Sign* 2/1986, p. 318.

36 Cf. Jyotsna VASUDEV, Sex differences in morality and moral orientation: A discussion of the Gilligan and Attanucci study, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, p. 241.

37 Anne COLBY and William DAMON, Listening to a different voice: A review of Gilligan's *In a different voice*, in *Moral Development. A Compendium. Volume 6: Caring Voices and Women's Moral Frames: Gilligan's View*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, p. 281.

38 Cf. Zella LURIA, A methodological critique, *Sign* 2/1986, p. 317.

39 Jyotsna VASUDEV, Sex differences in morality and moral orientation: A discussion of the Gilligan and Attanucci study, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, p. 241.

40 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 1–184.

41 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN, Sharry LANGDALE and Nona Plessner LYONS, *The Contribution of Women's Thought to Developmental Theory: The Elimination of Sex Bias in Moral Development Research and Education*, Cambridge: Reports-Research/Technical. Harvard University, 1982, p. 13.

In further research Gilligan speaks even more moderately, although she still to a certain extent insists on the male–female conception. Together with Attanucci,<sup>42</sup> she presents her research finding that justice and care are part of human thinking about the moral dilemmas of real life, but people tend to view moral problems more through the lens of one orientation, while the other tends not to be prominent in their decision-making. Men and women use both orientations, but, according to the authors, women tend to view dilemmas through the lens of care, while men through the lens of justice.

Despite all of the criticism, Gilligan remained convinced that in every human being there exist two moral voices: ‘*One voice speaks of connection, not hurting, care, and response; and one speaks of equality, reciprocity, justice, and rights.*’<sup>43</sup> One of these voices always tends to be dominant. Although according to Gilligan this dominance is not gender-specific, it is gender-connected.

Scientists continuing in the research included other variables besides the respondent’s gender, such as the presented type of dilemma, the time lapse of the evaluated dilemma, the gender of the story protagonist, etc. They come up with almost contradictory conclusions depending on which theory is favoured by the particular researcher, which research methods are employed and how the data is statistically processed. For example, Donenberg and Hoffman reached different conclusions depending on the method used.<sup>44</sup> When the scoring method according to Lyons was used,<sup>45</sup> girls really manifested a greater orientation towards care, but boys were equally oriented towards care and justice. But when Kohlberg’s method was used, gender differences were not found, just as the sex of the protagonist within Heintz’s dilemma had no effect on the respondents’ moral judgment.<sup>46</sup>

Walker<sup>47</sup> inclines to the view that in researching moral judgment it is essential to check the other variables. He thinks that studies that have found differences in the moral judgment of men and women have in fact mistaken sex for the level of education and employment.

Perhaps the problem of differences between individuals consists already in the very concept of ‘moral’. As Brown<sup>48</sup> has pointed out, different things can constitute a moral problem for different people. According to Walker and his co-workers,<sup>49</sup> the only real difference between male and female conception lies in the very topics they perceive and present as morally dilemmatic. That means that each sex perceives something else as morally dilemmatic. Women more frequently came up with personal, relationship-oriented dilemmas from their own lives. These dilemmas then evoke the orientation on care more than another type of dilemma.<sup>50</sup> According to Walker,<sup>51</sup> it is impossible to say that one orientation is male and the other female. Gender differences between the sexes do exist, but they are not as pervasive as Gilligan assumed.<sup>52</sup> But it holds for both sexes that personal relationship problems evoke the orientation on care.

Other investigators, on the other hand, deny that there is any connection whatsoever between

42 Cf. Carol GILLIGAN and Jane ATTANUCCI, Two moral orientations: Gender differences and similarities, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 3/1988, p. 132.

43 Carol GILLIGAN, Mapping the moral domain: New images of self in relationship, *Cross Currents* 1/1989, p. 54.

44 Cf. Geri R. DONENBERG and Lois W. HOFFMAN, Gender differences in moral development, *Sex Roles* 11-12/1988, pp. 714–715.

45 Cf. Nona Plessner LYONS, Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality, *Harvard Educational Review* 2/1983, pp. 143–145.

46 Cf. Geri R. DONENBERG and Lois W. HOFFMAN, Gender differences in moral development, *Sex Roles* 11-12/1988, pp. 712–713.

47 Cf. Lawrence J. WALKER, Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review, *Child Development* 3/1984, p. 677.

48 Cf. Lyn M. BROWN, When is a moral problem not a moral problem? in *Moral Development. A Compendium. Volume 6: Caring Voices and Women’s Moral Frames: Gilligan’s View*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, p. 144.

49 Cf. Lawrence J. WALKER, Brian de VRIES and Shelley D. TREVETHAN, Moral stages and moral orientations in real-life and hypothetical dilemmas, *Child Development* 3/1987, p. 842.

50 Ibid, pp. 855–856.

51 Cf. Lawrence J. WALKER, A longitudinal study of moral reasoning, *Child Development* 1/1989, p. 165.

52 Cf. Michael W. PRATT, Gail GOLDING, William HUNTER and Rosemarie SAMPSON, Sex differences in adult moral orientations, *Journal of Personality* 2/1988, p. 373.

moral orientation and gender. The summarising study of Jaffee and Hyde,<sup>53</sup> conceived as a meta-analysis of 113 partial studies dealing with moral orientation, did not confirm a connection between moral orientation and gender, although it does acknowledge the existence of different moral orientations.

As we can see, the research findings are very much contradictory. But it has turned out that the differences in the moral judgment of individuals can be due to a number of causes, other than the respondent's sex (for example, to the character of the moral dilemma being considered). In conclusion it is possible to say that the existence of marked differences between men and women in the issue of moral judgment has not been proven, although the studies have yielded some findings concerning the forms of female and male judgment-formation.

### 5.3 One or two moralities?

The morality of care, or the moral orientation on care, first had to uphold its position next to the morality of justice. It was not an easy path, but today its existence is generally acknowledged. Gilligan herself admits the coexistence of the two theories of morality (morality of justice and morality of care):

*The experiences of inequality and interconnection, inherent in the relation of parent and child, then give rise to the ethics of justice and care, the ideals of human relationship – the vision that self and other will be treated as of equal worth, that despite differences in power, things will be fair; the vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt.*<sup>54</sup>

The difference between the morality of justice and the morality of care does not consist only in that one is exclusively female and the other exclusively male, although some of the cited studies have shown a greater preference for the moral orientation on care in women.<sup>55</sup> A certain type of dilemmatic situation being discussed can only be associated with one of the two moral orientations. According to Gilligan, the morality of justice is more context-independent and its thinking is more abstract and hypothetical. The morality of care, on the other hand, is more context-dependent, deriving from the real situation. Turiel<sup>56</sup> says that people oriented to justice are more capable of de-contextualisation – i.e., of abstracting from the situation. According to Nunner-Winkler,<sup>57</sup> on the other hand, familiarity with the situation's context is a pre-condition of all particular moral judgments. In other words, she disagrees with the claim that morality of care is more context-dependent, while the morality of justice is more universal.

Defending the existence of a moral orientation on care and a moral orientation on justice has brought along the elaboration of procedures making it possible to identify the two orientations.<sup>58</sup>

53 Cf. Sara JAFFEE and Janet Shibley HYDE, Gender differences in moral orientation: A metaanalysis. *Psychological Bulletin* 5/2000, p. 720.

54 Carol GILLIGAN, *Jiným hlasem*, Praha: Portál, 2001, p. 87.

55 Cf. Michael W. PRATT, Gail GOLDING, William HUNTER, Rosemarie SAMPSON, Sex differences in adult moral orientations, *Journal of Personality* 2/1988, p. 373; further cf. Lawrence J. WALKER, Brian de VRIES and Shelley D. TREVETHAN, Moral stages and moral orientations in real-life and hypothetical dilemmas, *Child Development* 3/1987, p. 842.

56 Cf. Elliot TURIEL, The development of morality, in *Handbook of Child Psychology*, ed. Richard M. LERNER, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006, p. 808.

57 Cf. Gertrud NUNNER-WINKLER, Two moralities? A critical discussion of an ethic of care and responsibility versus an ethic of rights and justice, in *Moral Development. A Compendium. Volume 6: Caring Voices and Women's Moral Frames: Gilligan's View*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, p. 264.

58 Cf. Lyn M. BROWN, Mark B. TAPPAN, Carol GILLIGAN, Barbara A. MILLER and Dianne E. ARGYRIS, Reading for self and moral voice: A method for interpreting narratives of real-life moral conflict and choice, in *Moral Development. A Compendium. Volume 6: Caring Voices and Women's Moral Frames: Gilligan's View*, ed. Bill PUKA, New York: Garland Pub, 1994, pp. 166–174; further cf. Nona Plessner LYONS, Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality, *Harvard Educational Review* 2/1983, pp. 143–145.



But the issue for professional discussion and further research is rather how these two moral orientations merge, complement each other, and co-form each other.

One possible solution is presented by Turiel.<sup>59</sup> According to him, Kohlberg's theory also includes respect for others. The concept of justice and fairness includes a way of upholding human relationships so that no one is mistreated in them. According to Held,<sup>60</sup> it is not difficult to find differences between the two approaches, but overt integration may wipe out justified differences between the two approaches. However, she thinks that the problem of meaningfully merging the two approaches has not been solved yet:

*...an adequate, comprehensive moral theory will have to include the insights of both the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, among other insights, rather than that either of these can be incorporated into the other in the sense of supposing that it can provide the grounds for the judgments characteristically found in the other. Equitable caring is not necessarily better caring, it is fairer caring. And humane justice is not necessarily better justice, it is more caring justice... But how care and justice are to be meshed without losing sight of their differing priorities is a task still being worked on.*<sup>61</sup>

The morality of care and the morality of justice co-exist as two fully acknowledged theories. Just as we will not get by with the morality of justice in all situations (sometimes it simply is not possible to choose a totally just solution), so the morality of care does not capture all dilemmatic moments. The remaining question to be considered is how the just attitude merges with the caring attitude and at what points of these theories we call the same thing by different concepts. And as it is difficult to define what morality in fact is, it is difficult to say what and how it is to be investigated by the psychology of morality. The mosaic of our notions of the functioning of human moral judgment in everyday life has been and still is formed by fragments of the research findings.

## Conclusion

This paper has aimed to present the work of Carol Gilligan in the broader context of psychological research. Its message goes in two directions – it concerns the psychology of morality, and the methodology. With her work *In a Different Voice* and with her attitude towards morality, Gilligan crashed the only paradigm existing in the field of the psychology of morality at the time. She was the first to investigate the real-life dilemmas of the respondents. Thereby she opened up a field of morality which had remained obscure to Kohlberg using hypothetical dilemmas. These two theories show what is also manifest throughout the sequence of further studies. The results of research, and we can generally say of any research, may be influenced by the selected method of data acquisition, as well as by a certain philosophical attitude towards their interpretation.

Gilligan committed a number of grave methodological errors (insufficient description of sample, absence of coding scheme, unclear distinction between respondent quotes and theoretical speculations of the researcher, bias or even ideology, etc.), which could serve to instruct (not only) students writing their first research study. From the scientific point of view, Gilligan's original work is unbelievably chaotic, unsystematic, yet nonetheless highly readable. It reaches out to readers, who find in it what they know from their own lives. The criticism of principal methodological slips is

59 Cf. Elliot TURIEL, The development of morality, in *Handbook of Child Psychology*, ed. Richard. M. LERNER, Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006, p. 807.

60 Cf. Virginia HELD, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 15–16.

61 Cf. Virginia HELD, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 16.

justified, and yet the book today belongs amongst basic literature. Gilligan is regarded as a pioneer of new ideas and approaches at several levels (besides the psychology of morality, also in gender studies, philosophy, ethics, sociology, etc.). Ultimately, the criticism induced not only Gilligan, but also Kohlberg to revise, verify, re-examine or even adjust their theories. The results of subsequent studies often contradict each other, but two valid conclusions can be drawn from them:

- It is generally acknowledged that besides the morality of justice begun by Kohlberg there exists also the morality of care as discovered by Gilligan.
- It cannot be claimed that the morality of care is an exclusively female matter. But it is generally accepted that certain topics are associated with one of the two moral orientations (for example, relationship issues tend to evoke the orientation of care in the respondent).

But Gilligan is not only *Another Voice*; her work also brings further elaboration, repeated re-examination, and shifts in her own claims, but also the entire philosophical current of ethics of care, which can offer answers to some existential questions concerning the meaning of life to psychology, answers to the recurrent question of good and evil. The ethics of care offers a new paradigm, in which the self is conceived as connected with others, as dependent (in a positive sense of the word) on others. Perhaps this is where we could find an alternative to the burgeoning individualism and assertiveness of our time.

## The Morality of Care – Its Origin, Reception and Further Development from the Point of View of the Psychology of Morality

### Abstract

Gilligan's research on women considering abortion was a turning point in the field of moral psychology and its methodology. Gilligan discovered a new aspect of morality by using a real-life moral dilemma. She was confronted with strong methodological criticism. Further research did not confirm the assumption of male and female morality. However, two coexisting moral orientations are generally acknowledged: an orientation towards justice and an orientation towards care. This has given rise to a relatively new philosophical current called the ethic of care. Its groundwork is the perspective of care focusing on people's needs, improving real relationships and cultivating sensitivity towards the present situation.

**Keywords:** psychology of morality, ethic of care, Carol Gilligan, criticism, methodology, moral orientation

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